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Working Draft

Study in "Black"

Definitions:

9/1 /11

"Black" and "White"

as relate to psychological warfare

"Black" measures. Covert measures, conducted by forces apparently friendly to the enemy or by subversive forces within enemy territory. These may be implemented by radio "freedom" stations, false rumors, false leaflets and documents, fifth column activities, sabotage, guerilla warfare, and support of underground resistance groups.

"White" propaganda. Overt propaganda, issued from reputable, known
U. S. official or other sources, or from countries known to be friendly to the U. S.
"White" propaganda may be implemented by press, radio, leaflets, pamphlets, and voice.

"Black"History, etc.

SWNCC 304-1/2 (Conclusions approved)

The National Intelligence Authority (Central Intelligence Agency) () mine, has an interest in intelligence and certain other aspects of psychological warfare.

3 March 1942. The JCS created (in JCS 12) the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) which was envisaged as the ultimate authority over both foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations. (This Committee's functions were absorbed by other agencies).

12 June 1942. The office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established by Military Order under the jurisdiction of the JCS for the prupose of collecting and analysing such strategic information as required by the JCS for military planning and in conducting special operations not assigned to other government agencies.

23 February 1943. The Director, OSS, sent to the JCS a memo enclosing the first "overall strategic plan for United States psychological warfare". This memorandum became JCS 230 dated 1 March 1945. (Certain provisions of the memorandum having to do with the functions of OSS were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 155/11/D, on 27 October 1943).

2 March 1943. The JCS approved the first basic plan for psychological warfare prepared by OSS. (Basic plan for psychological warfare in Italy, contained in JCS 139/2).

10 March 1942. The President issued an order which clarified OWI responsibilities and more carefully circumscribed the functions of OSS and its operations and the relation of such operations to military operations under the direction of military theater commanders.

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"Black" & "White": Considerations to conduct MO "Black"

OSS moved into North Burma after PWT was already well established. It
became necessary then to differentiate between "black" and "white" propaganda.

Having differentiated between "black" and "white". The team (PWT) translated for MO officers, loaned them materials, provided propaganda information, and on several occasions produced MO leaflets.

There was no formal integration. Close and cordial relations and information exchange promoted mutual apprisal of the others activities. Adequate integration in planning was never achieved there (North Burma).

"Black" propaganda formed an adjunct to guerella operations.

"White" propaganda tended to be related to American policy.

The team (PWT) felt that a more effective contribution would have been achieved if "black" and "white" propaganda stemmed from the same planning source.

A proposition was advanced as a recommendation in the report of the P.W.T.

"We have dome to the conclusion that it would have been of considerable help to us to have had a central propaganda unit in the States supplying basic thinking and material on propaganda to Japanese Troops."

"This is a separate need from that supplied by policy directives. What is invended is a Service agency organized to send out to tactical field units a core of propaganda planning as distinguished from the establishment of political policy.

A central psychological warfare Unit not only could keep a flow of these basic propaganda materials moving out to the field, but it could facilitate an exchange of propaganda findings and experiences between the various outposts, and further, could serve as a propaganda service center." (For fuller details of the proposition see Appendix 1 to PWT report of 25 April 1945).

"Black": Planning Security, etc.

Basic prepositions:

- 1. That "black" operations be planned by military planners using such nonmilitary adivsors and expert assistants as may be appropriate and required.
- 2. The plans that may be drawn up should be integrated with military plans and be subject to JCS approval. Lower level plans to be subject to concurrence of the appropriate military echelon commander concerned.


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3. The organization for Black have the strength and structure of military organization from the top to the level of commands of the operational organization. This toward insuring the required security of plans, operations, and information. At lower levels of operations it will probably require employment and deployment of non-American nationals or alien agents or operators. The organization parts employing others than highly secure individuals of U. S. citisenship should be compartmented from other levels and be designed to insure security of information horizontally as well as vertically.

It appears to me that planning on the various levels can be conducted by adequate liaison concerning "white" and "black" and that adequate security of information measures can be developed at these liaison points.

physical
On the operational level there must be definite, separation of personnel
and operations.

This appears to me to involve side by side structures of organisation tied together for planning on the various levels.



Tentaline "Black" Functional Chart 9/22/47